When Should Rights  Trump ? An Examination of Speech and Property by Underkuffler, Laura S.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 52 Number 2 Article 3 
February 2018 
When Should Rights "Trump"? An Examination of Speech and 
Property 
Laura S. Underkuffler 
University of Maine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Property Law and Real 
Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Laura S. Underkuffler, When Should Rights "Trump"? An Examination of Speech and Property, 52 Me. L. 
Rev. 311 (2018). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/3 
This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
WHEN SHOULD RIGHTS "TRUMP"? AN EXAMINA-
TION OF SPEECH AND PROPERTY
Laura S. Underkuffler
I. INTRODUCnON ............................................................................................ 312
H. CoNucrs BMWEEN INDVIUAL RIams Am Gov.mmNr Im.Esrs:
T E PS I M ODEL .............................................................................. 313
III. Tim PimummvW PowER oF Rims: RETwN PIoUr ...................... 314
IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 322
MAINE LAW REVIEW
WHEN SHOULD RIGHTS "TRUMP"? AN EXAMINA-
TION OF SPEECH AND PROPERTY
Laura S. Underkuffler *
I. INTRODUCrION
In his well-known article, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust,l Pro-
fessor Richard Epstein-a leading contemporary voice in the fields of property
theory and constitutional law-makes a simple but compelling argument. There
has been, he argues, a mistake in "the dominant mode of thinking about property
rights during the past fifty years [that] has been. . of constitutional dimensions.' 2
This mistake, in Professor Epstein's view, is the refusal of the federal courts to
accord to individual property rights the same kind of protection from government
regulation that is accorded to other constitutional rights. Using free speech as his
example, Professor Epstein argues that the "attitude of distrust"3 with which courts
approach government regulation of speech should animate-in equal measure-
their approach to government regulation of property.4 Both are constitutional rights,
of equal stature; both are of critical importance to the freedom of individuals; both
should, as a matter of law and policy, be afforded the same protection, the same
presumptive power.
In decrying the courts' apparent failure to protect property rights, Professor
Epstein is, of course, not alone. An array of academic and political commentators
has lamented the courts' apparent failure to recognize government regulation of
land use or other government regulatory or distributive efforts as "takings" by
government which should--under the Fifth Amendment's explicit terms 5-be com-
pensated.6 Professor Epstein's juxtaposition of free speech rights and property
rights serves, however, to place this question in particularly sharp relief. If-as a
matter of explicit constitutional text-we protect speech, and if--also as a matter
of explicit constitutional text-we protect property, how can we justify the strin-
gent protection of the former, and the very weak protection of the latter? We might
like land-use controls or environmental controls; we might like state laws that take
wealth from one person and give it to another, but the fact that such sentiments are
held--even by a majority of citizens-does not justify disregard of what the law,
as a constitutional matter, requires. Aren't rights, after all, rights?
I shall argue that Professor Epstein and other property-rights advocates are
wrong: that a simple equation cannot be drawn between rights to free speech and
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. This Essay is adapted from the Godfrey
Distinguished Visiting Professor Lecture, delivered at the University of Maine School of Law
on November 4, 1999.
1. Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. Ci. L. Ray. 41
(1992).
2. Id. at 41.
3. Id. at 48.
4. See id. at 48-49.
5. "INMor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
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property rights, with the "politics of distrust" the required principle for consider-
ing government regulation of each. Rather, I shall argue that them are fundamen-
tal differences between free speech rights and property rights, and the public inter-
ests that oppose them, which require very different treatment. I shall argue that the
apparent judicial disregard of property rights is not an unprincipled aberration in
our law; rather, it is a reflection--a genuine, even compelled reflection-of the
deeper tensions and structures that are an inherent part of property/public interest
conflicts.
IL CONFLICTS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND GOVERNMENT INTERESTS:
THE EPSTEINIAN MODEL
In his article 7 Professor Epstein begins with a simple proposition. Because
those in positions of political power are human beings, they face a constant temp-
tation to act in ways that are personally self-serving or otherwise undesirable from
an objective or enlightened point of view.8 Because of basic human frailties and
other problems, we cannot assume that those in power will be "'enlightened states-
men [who] will be able to adjust... clashing interests and render them all subser-
vient to the public good."' 9 We must, instead, keep in mind the potentially oppres-
sive power of government, and view its actions with distrust. 10
When we consider constitutional rights in light of this principle, Professor
Epstein argues, the conclusion must be in favor of well-defined rights which pro-
tect individuals against the exercise of government power. 11 The protection of
speech and property "should." he writes, "be read in light of these political con-
cems." 12 Through freedom of speech, we (as a society) can combat government
actions and government misconduct. 13 The protection of property is similarly
crucial. "The motivation for the Takings Clause... come[s] from a fear that the
legislature has imperfect knowledge, imperfect motives, or both." 14 It is the con-
stitutionally provided protection for the property holder against "legislative
abuse." 15
The implementation of this philosophical stance does not, of course, translate
into a total ban against all government regulation of speech or property. Rather, it
translates into a strong presumption that speech and property are protected, and
that this protection can be overridden only by a compelling government interest. 16
"The modem insistence that speech is a fundamental liberty, while property is
6. See, e.g., JAmS V. DELoNG, PaoPurrm MArrE~s: How Puomay-r Rcrs Ame UNDm As-
sAULT-ND WHY You SHouwD Cum (1997); NAm G. MaJuA & RomJ. MAmni. P~o?-
Emy RiGHns: UNDSrAmDIxG Govm wemrrTAmaNs Am' Ewvmo.mwAL ORmuLmN (1997).
7. See Epstein, supra note I.
8. See id. at 48-49.
9. Id. at 49 n.25 (quoting THm FmKUST No. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
10. See id. at 49.
11. Seeid. at49-59.
12. Id. at 49.
13. See id. at 49-50.
14. Id. at 52.
15. d.
16. See id. at 45.
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[merely] the creature of legislation and subject to its whims, '17 is-Professor
Epstein writes-completely at odds with these fundamental principles. The con-
stitutional clauses that protect both have an "essentially libertarian cast...: strong,
decentralized private rights and a central government with limited powers, any
exercise of which must be justified." 18
The model that Professor Epstein sketches is a familiar and compelling one.
Speech and property are constitutionally protected because we, as a society, have
decided to protect them against the pressures of majoritarian government. They
are-as a matter of constitutional text and constitutional theory--of apparently
equal standing and equal power. Just as the right to free speech is deemed to be
presumptively more powerful than competing public interests, as expressed through
ordinary legislation, so must the right to property. To argue otherwise is to contra-
dict the principles of limited government and the understandings of rights that
ground our political system.
Having made that observation, however, we are left with an odd paradox. For,
as Professor Epstein readily acknowledges-indeed, it is the core fact of which he
complains-the courts have repeatedly failed to implement this evident truth.
Speech is rigidly protected; property, in the main, is not. As Professor Epstein
writes, "under the present state of affairs .... there is essentially no protection of
property... against prospective legislation, or... [often] against retroactive leg-
islation as well." 19 Property interests-despite their constitutionally protected sta-
tus-routinely yield to the ordinary goals of government. 20 Whether one thinks of
zoning laws, historic preservation laws, wetlands preservation laws, or laws that
simply redistribute income or advance one person's commercial interests at the
expense of another's, it is apparent that the courts routinely uphold government
regulations "that destroyn or adversely affect[] recognized... property interests." 2 1
Have the courts, as Professor Epstein argues, simply "gone ... astray ' 2 2 in
their differing treatment of property and speech? Have they simply failed to ap-
preciate the values involved, as he argues? Or are there other, more important
reasons why the presumptive power of speech should not be translated, so easily,
into the presumptive power of property?
III. THE PRESUMPTIVE POWER OF RIGHTS: RETHINKING PROPERTY
In order to examine the question of what presumptive power property rights
should have in law, we must begin by considering what "rights"-as an abstract
matter, in this context-are.
A declaration of right clothes an interest with awesome rhetorical, political,
and legal power. "I have a right" is a challenge to the world: my interest, which I
17. Id. at 46.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 46-47.
20. The Supreme Court has indicated on numerous occasions that public interests of a very
general nature may be sustained in the face of asserted property rights. See, e.g., Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) ("substantial public purpose"); Nectow
v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) ("public health, safety, morals, or general welfare").
The range of government purposes and regulations that satisfies these requirements is "broad."
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987).
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assert, is-presumptively, at least-superior to all non-rights interests with which
it might conflict. The assertion of an individual right carries with it a powerful
message of individual autonomy and the protection of the individual interests from
the claims or predations of others.
The division of demands into those that are rights-based and those that are not
is deeply entrenched in political rhetoric, moral philosophy, and law. The view of
rights as normative demands with particular strength which "trump" (at least as a
prima facie matter) non-rights interests that conflict with them can be found in the
discussion of any contemporary social issue. Property owners claim a "right" to
develop their land in violation of state or local environmental laws. Purveyors of
pornography and adult entertainment claim a "right" to be free of government
regulation. Citizens claim a "right" o doctor-assisted suicide.
Scholarly exploration of the precise nature of rights has generated an immense
literature. Competing notions of rights include rights as the absence of prohibi-
tions, rights as positive authorizations, rights as reflections of obligations, rights
as powers, and rights as immunitiesP3 Uniting these common conceptions of rights
is the idea that a right protects the right-holder's interest (however defined) by
imposing constraints on the actions of other people.2 4
In conflicts between individual and collective, rights of individuals are usu-
ally contrasted with public-interest demands. "Public interests" are usually under-
stood, in law, to be utilitarian or otherwise derived aggregative social concerns
that provide reasons for coercive legal action. When we declare an individual
demand to be a right, in law, it is because we take the individual and his interests
seriously. To honor this grounding, individual rights must, as a prima facie matter
at least, be deemed more powerful than competing public interests.2 5
Thus far, our understanding of the nature and function of rights seems to be
quite congruent with that of Professor Epstein and other property-rights advocates.
The purpose of rights (under this understanding) is to protect individual interests
against public-interest demands. In the constitutional context, this means that con-
stitutional rights protect individual interests against the acts of government. They
can be overridden-but only by a societal goal of special or compelling urgency.
They cannot be defeated by the ordinary or routine goals of government. 26
Is this, however, all that our implementation of the notion of rights in law
involves? Do we simply--and mechanically-I) determine if the individual inter-
est asserts a right (as legally defined); 2) determine if the public interest is-in
21. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 125.
22. Epstein, supra note 1, at 59.
23. See, e.g., Carlos Nifio, Introduction in RtIGT xi, xiii-xix (Carlos Nufio ed., 1992) (dis-
cussing competing theories of rights).
24. See Joseph Raz, On the Nature of Rights, 93 Meo 194, 195, 199 (1984).
25. See, e.g., Robert Alexy, Individual Right and Collective Goods, in Ricus, supra note
19, at 163, 178-79 (the idea of taking the individual seriously requires "a general prima facie
priority in favour of individual rights"; "there (must] be stronger grounds in favour of... (al
resolution required by collective goods than exist for that required by individual rights").
26. See, e.g., RONALD Dwoua, TAING RiGHrs SDPuOUSLY 92 (1977). See also Alexy, supra
note 25, at 179 (the "[p]rima facie priority [of rights] does not exclude the setting aside of
individual rights" in favor of other interests; it simply demands that there be "stronger grounds"
in favor of the resolution required by other interests than is required for rights).
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fact-a collective one; and 3) afford the right "trumping" power, if the public in-
terest is not-by its very nature--"compelling"?
In fact, there is far more to this process than our description so far allows.
When we assign an individual demand the presumptive power afforded to rights,
we assume that we have done so on some kind of principled basis. We assume that
the process of designating particular demands as rights involves something more
than completely arbitrary political action. We assume that there are reasons why
some demands have been granted "rights power," and others have not.
We assume, in short, that there is something about the nature of the demands
that rights protect-something about the nature of the interests that these demands
assert- that justifies their presumptive power. The most commonly held (and, in
the end, the most persuasive) rationale for the presumptive power of rights is that
the interests that underlie rights involve values that are-as a prima facie matter,
at least-more important or more worthy (as a societally determined matter) than
competing non-rights interests. Thus, for example, freedom of speech has been
granted "rights" status and power because the values that it involves are more
important than those involved in competing (public) interests.
This "normative explanation" for the power of rights is certainly in keeping
with common notions of what rights are and why they are recognized in law. Free-
dom of speech, freedom of religion, the protection of property, equal protection,
and so on, involve values that we particularly prize in our society and are, accord-
ingly, interests to which we grant special legal protection.
This explanation for the power of rights has, however, an important and often
overlooked corollary. Under this explanation, the presumptive power of rights
adheres only if the values that the right involves are not shared, in fact, by the
competing public interest. If the values that underlie the claimed right are the
same, in kind, as the values that underlie the competing public interest, there is no
basis for a conclusion that the right involves normatively superior values, and no
basis for affording the right presumptive power.
The truth of this explanation of when and why rights enjoy presumptive power
can be illustrated by a familiar example involving the right to free speech. Let us
take, for instance, a newspaper's claimed right to publish a story on free speech
grounds, and the competing government interest in stopping publication to pre-
serve national security. This is a case in which we would all expect the claimed
right to enjoy presumptive power. Indeed, when we examine the conflicting claims
in this case, we find that the values that underlie the newspaper's claim-values
that are highly prized in our society-are unanswered by the competing public
interest demand. Whatever values are involved in the national security claim, they
are not those associated with the right to free speech. As a result, the claimed right
to free speech will have presumptive or prima facie power. The competing public
interest may ultimately prevail-but it must be of a particularly compelling nature
to do so.
Indeed, the general lack of identity between the values that underlie claimed
rights to free speech and the values that underlie opposing public interests explains
the presumptive power that free speech rights seem to so ubiquitously enjoy in
law. Almost never are the values that undergird free speech claims shared by the
public interests that oppose them. Although one can think of instances in which
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free speech values are also a part of the public-interest claim-for instance, when
pornographic speech or hate speech is opposed on the ground that it "silences"
women or members of minority groups2 7-those instances are very rare. As a
result, we tend to believe--and rightly so-that free speech rights will (always)
enjoy presumptive power in law.
Let us consider, now, the case of property. We will begin with this example:
an individual's claimed right to the exclusive use and control of her patented phar-
maceutical invention, and the opposing public interest in making that invention
available for the treatment of the largest number of citizens possible. Our general
understanding of how this conflict is resolved in law is clean The claimed right in
this case has clear presumptive power. Once an individual has obtained patent
rights, those rights cannot simply be abrogated, without legal consequence, in fa-
vor of the ordinary or routine goals of government. Although previously conferred
patent rights might be overcome by a competing public interest, it would take a
public interest of an extremely compelling kind-indeed, a national crisis of some
sort-for this to be justified.
This result-4his resolution by law-is explained by the values that the claimed
right and the competing public interest involve. The values that the claimed right
in this case involves are those associated with property: the protection of indi-
vidual security, the encouragement of individual initiative, the rewarding of in-
vestment, and so on. The values that the competing public interest involves are of
a completely different kind. The desire to prevent illness or to cure disease-
however laudable-has nothing to do with the reasons why we, as a society, have
chosen to privilege the patent claim. The values that underlie the claimed right are
unchallenged. As a result, the right enjoys presumptive power.
The legal treatment of patent claims is not, of course, what property-rights
advocates decry. Indeed, if all property claims were afforded the power of patent
claims, there undoubtedly would be no "crisis"--in their view--in the protection
of property. Their focus is, instead, on other kinds of property rights, such as those
involving land use or the protection of wealth from redistributive taxation. Profes-
sor Epstein argues, for instance, that under current court interpretations, "any le-
gitimate public function of conceivable merit justifies government restriction on
land use.... Aesthetics, popular sentiments, and environmental objectives all
become appropriate pegs on which to hang legal justifications for land use restric-
tions.,,28
To examine these claims, let us begin with the following case: the denial of
permission to develop shorefront land on the ground that this is necessary to pre-
vent erosion, to preserve the existing beach/dune system, and to otherwise protect
existing public and private beachfront areas. Refusals by local governments to
27. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71
B.U. L. REV. 793, 809 (1991) (discussing silencing effects of pornography); Patricia Williams,
Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to
Racism, 42 U. MiAim L. REV. 127, 129 (1987) (discussing silencing effects of racist speech). In
these cases, free speech values are involved in the claimed right and the competing public inter-
ests. Indeed, the difficulty that courts and commentators have had in the resolution of cases
involving such conflicts attests to the inapplicability of the usual, "trumping" relation between
claimed rights and competing public interests when evaluating these claims.
28. Epstein, supra note 1, at 76.
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grant shorefront development permits have, in fact, been frequent targets for tak-
ings claims. 29 Are complaints by property-rights advocates in such cases justi-
fied? To answer this question, we must consider the nature of the competing claims.
The asserted right-the ability to build on or to use one's land-is one that we
generally associate with property rights. The values that this right involves-the
protection of individual investments and expectations, the protection of individual
security, and so on---are values that we, as a society, highly prize.
What about the competing public interest? When we analyze it, we find that it
asserts-in fact-property-based values of a very similar kind. The protection of
the existing beach/dune system, the prevention of erosion, and like concerns, in-
volve the protection of the ability of others-public or private landowners-to
use, preserve, and enjoy their land. This is not a case--the usual "rights" case-in
which the values that are involved in the asserted right are unanswered by those
involved in the competing public interest. Rather, this is a case in which the claimed
right and the competing public interest involve values of the same or a very simi-
lar kind. The normative power of the values that the claimed right protects are
equaled by the normative power of the values that the public demand asserts. As a
result, there is-in fact-no reason to afford the claimed right presumptive or trump-
ing power.
Indeed, to afford the claimed right presumptive power in this case would cre-
ate a very peculiar situation in our law. To grant the claimed right in this case such
power simply because it is a "right" would mean that the legal protection afforded
to particular interests would depend solely upon the fortuity of whether they are
asserted under an "individual" or a "collective" label. There is no reason why the
property interests of one person should be presumptively superior to the property
interests of many persons, simply because the interests of the many are asserted
"publicly" or "collectively." It is the nature of the interests and the values that they
assert-not the identities or numbers of the holders-that should determine nor-
mative power. If the claimed property right and the competing public interest
involve interests and values of the same kind-if, for instance, the land-use or
preservation claims of one landowner are opposed by the collectively asserted land-
use or preservation claims of others-there is no reason to give the individual
claim presumptive power.
The reason that the property right lacks presumptive power in this case is-
perhaps-fairly easily seen, since we are all familiar with the "nuisance paradigm"--
the idea that the use of land by one person cannot impair the land use or enjoyment
of others. Indeed, Professor Epstein acknowledges that nuisance law "constrains"
the freedom with which landowners might otherwise act. 30 What must be real-
ized, however, is that nuisance is not- as some have argued-some kind of "ex-
ception" to the otherwise broad and unassailable power of property rights. Rather,
it is simply one manifestation of a very basic principle: that the normative basis
for the presumed superiority of a property right--or any right-fails when it is
opposed by a public interest which involves values of a similar kind.
This principle explains, in fact, the lack of presumptive power afforded to a
wide range of property rights claims. Let us consider, for instance, a broad eco-
29. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
30. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 58.
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logical measure, such as the preservation of wetlands and the marine life that they
spawn. Let us assume, further, that this measure is opposed by landowners whose
previously permitted uses are now curtailed. How should this conflict be resolved?
With what notions of presumptive power should we approach this conflict?
Popular notions about the presumptive powers of individual and collective
claims in this context are mixed. While there is generally broad support for envi-
ronmental laws, some have targeted them as examples of unjustified assaults on
citizens' property rights. Legal treatment of these cases has, however, been re-
markably uniform. Few courts have accepted the "trumping" model of individual
property rights over environmental laws that property-rights advocates have de-
manded. In fact, in the nearly twenty-five years since the National Environmental
Policy Act,31 the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct, 32 and the Federal Clean Air
Act3 3 were enacted, no legal challenge to the fundamental validity of these laws
has been seriously entertained. As one property-rights advocate has lamented,
"[tihe federal courts have withdrawn from the protection of property [in these cases],
except for occasional unpredictable interventions in some of the most egregious
situations." 34 Why is this so? Why-despite the bitterness generated in some
quarters by, for instance, wetlands preservation laws-has the essential parity of
these control initiatives with private property rights been so broadly assumed?
If we examine these claims, we find that there are, in fact, deeply rooted rea-
sons why private property claims lack presumptive power when opposed by envi-
ronmental laws. Those who lament the courts' treatment of these cases make a
crucial assumption: that the private property claims involve values of a uniquely
powerful and compelling character, which deserve presumptive power vis-a-vis
competing public claims. In fact, even a cursory consideration of the competing
values that underlie these claims reveals this assumption to be untrue.
Let us take, for instance, the restriction of private land use to preserve coastal
wetlands. This conflict pits the claimed property right of the landowner to use his
land against the public interest in the wetlands' protection. The values that under-
lie the claimed right are ones with which we are very familiar. The ability to
protect individual investments and expectations in land is something which is highly
valued and which is traditionally associated with property rights.
What about the conflicting public interest? The preservation claim, asserted
by the public interest, is not to preserve one's own wetlands, but the wetlands of
others. As a consequence, the values that underlie this public interest--as so far
understood--are quite different from the values that underlie the claimed right.
Whether the public demands preservation for aesthetic, cultural, psychological, or
other reasons, it is apparent that these values are--arguably, at least--quite differ-
ent from those generally associated with property rights.
If this were all that this story involved, we would-it would seem-have a
property right with traditional, presumptive power. However, the values that the
31. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994)).
32. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)).
33. The Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994)).
34. DELONG, supra note 6, at 88.
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public interest asserts cannot be understood so narrowly. Because of the physical
and biological interdependence of wetlands, other shoreline lands, and the oceans
that border them--because the filling or pollution of wetlands destroys the animal
life, plant life, and physical integrity of other land and bodies of water in a way
that transcends the boundaries of particular parcels-the landowner's desired ac-
tions affect not only his own property interests, but the property interests of others
as well. Those who want to maintain the physical and biological integrity of coastal
areas for shellfish harvesting, tourism, recreation, or other purposes clearly have
property interests of their own at stake that are as real as those of the thwarted
landowner. As Joseph Sax has written:
A pristine example of the inextricability of property interests is marine life that
breeds along the shallow wetlands shorelines, depending upon maintenance of
the shoreline habitat. The wetlands owner thus does not use only his own tract,
but demands, as a condition of developing his property, that ocean users tolerate
a change in their use of the ocean. 35
We recognize, in such environmental laws, that protectable property interests in
physical resources go far beyond the narrow concern of simple freedom to use
one's land. We recognize, in such laws, that the interests asserted by the claimed
right, and the interests asserted by the public interest, are-by their very nature-
inextricably and unalterably interdependent.
This interdependent nature of property interests---the fact that protection of
one person's property interests so often affects the property interests of others-
explains why property rights so often lack, and should lack, presumptive power in
law. The assumed normative superiority of the values that the claimed right pro-
tects--the assumption that drives the presumptive power of rights-is absent in a
broad range of cases involving property rights and competing public interests.
Whether one considers zoning controls, environmental laws, historic preservation
laws, or laws that simply protect one commercial interest at the expense of an-
other, it is apparent that the claimed rights involved do not have a monopoly on the
values that we associate with property protection. The claim by Professor Epstein
and others that speech and property should be equally powerful and equally pro-
tected ignores the fact that speech and property are critically different in this re-
gard. Although the normative superiority of the claimed right fails only rarely in
free speech cases, this is a routine occurrence in property cases, particularly those
that involve physical resources.
The interdependent nature of property interests explains many instances in
which property rights fail to enjoy presumptive power. It does not, however, ex-
plain all of them. In particular, it does not explain why we tolerate, so readily, state
schemes that have-as their purpose-simple redistribution of property or wealth.
Our apparent tolerance of government schemes to redistribute property is a
chronic source of irritation and perplexity to those who advocate the presumptive
power of property rights. There is no more definitive interference with property
rights than the taking of title; yet we find casual (if any) constitutional concern
about what are simply redistributive transfers. The apparent ease with which wealth
can be taken from one citizen and transferred (through taxation and the mecha-
35. Joseph L. Sax, Taldngs, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YAu L. 149, 159 (1971).
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nisms of welfare programs) to other citizens is inexplicable under traditional no-
tions of property rights. In most of these transfers, the monetary benefits received
by the recipients far outweigh the monetary benefits received by the parties taxed;
yet these transfers do not generate the kind of outrage that one would expect from
such marked and widespread disregard of property rights.
Why are these transfers not "takings"? Why do the courts-and, seemingly,
most citizens-see these transfers as "exceptions" to the constitutional protection
of property? Many answers to this question have been offered-for instance, that
taxpayers see such transfers as 'isurance" for themselves in their own times of
need, or that they receive value in exchange for these transfers in the form of
prevention of civil unrest or other public goods. There is undoubtedly some truth
in these explanations. I believe, however, that there is another explanation for our
tolerance of these transfers, one that is deeply rooted in the nature of rights, gov-
ernment, and property regimes themselves.
The model of individual/state relations that property-rights advocates argue to
be the premise of our government is one in which human freedoms exist, and the
state's actions must be prevented from destroying those freedoms. It assumes, in
Professor Epstein's words, that previously existing, "fundamental" freedoms must
be protected from government power.3 6
When one considers many constitutionally protected freedoms, this model
seems to be very true. We seek-through freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and so on--to protect ourselves from
the dangers of government. The state's role regarding those freedoms is at best
protecting, and at worst oppressing, but whatever its stance, it is--essentially-an
external one. The state does not create these freedoms, nor allocate them to us. It
simply protects-or destroys-what we, as human beings, would otherwise freely,
naturally, and equally enjoy.
What about property? Here, the state's role is completely and essentially dif-
ferent. Property involves conflicting claims; it involves disputes and ownership
claims over identifiable wealth, finite resources. If my right to possess this land is
upheld, your claim to possess that land is denied. If my right to clear cut timber,
deplete species, or strip mine land is upheld, your right to control those resources
is denied. The state-in creating and enforcing property rights--makes deliber-
ate, binding, and final choices about who shall enjoy and who shall not. It neces-
sarily and affirmatively grants the acquisitive claims of some people, and denies
the same claims of others. Property rights, in law, are rarely the simple protection
of natural and preexisting human freedoms; they are almost always positive rights,
allocative rights.
It is because property rights are so often allocative in nature-it is because
they so often involve honoring the interests of some, to the detriment of the iden-
tical interests of others--that we accept redistributive schemes. The claim of a
property holder against a redistributive action is grounded-if at all-in the nor-
mative superiority of the values that his claim (presumably) involves. If, however,
the claimed right and the competing public interest are grounded in the same val-
ues-if, for instance, the need for security of those with wealth is opposed by a
36. Epstein, supra note 1, at 46.
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public interest which asserts (through welfare programs, Medicare programs, or
other means) the security interests of others-then the reason for the presumed
superiority of the claimed right is severely undermined. There is no obvious rea-
son why we should privilege the need for human security or the need to appropri-
ate the necessities of life of one individual over the identical needs of another.
There is no reason to believe (on this basis, at least) that the claimed right protects
more important values, or-as a consequence--deserves presumptive power.
Property rights are not, in short, private freedoms that the state neutrally abides.
Property rights are collectively enforced, even violent decisions about who shall
enjoy the privileges and resources of this society. The classic liberal model of
individual rights, in which the state must be "hands off" and all can enjoy, might
describe-and justify--the protection of speech, religion, or other such freedoms.
It does not describe--or justify---the protection of property.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether rights have the presumptive power that is claimed for them is a tre-
mendously important issue. It is important not only as a legal matter-in deter-
mining, for instance, whether there is a violation of the Takings Clause-but also
for the role that it plays in shaping the social and political debates that, in turn,
shape our laws. The outrage that a publisher feels when his speech is curtailed-
the outrage that a landowner feels when her ability to drain wetlands is denied-
depends, deeply and psychologically, upon the idea of the presumptive power of
rights.
The idea that property rights are presumptively powerful, bounded and pro-
tected, is a deeply ingrained and enduring one. It is also an important and justified
one, in those cases in which the values that underlie claimed property rights are
unanswered by the public interests that oppose them. The power of this idea must
not, however, blind us to the actual choices and justice issues that the "right to
property" so often involves. If we persist in the simplistic idea that property is-
and should be-an invariably powerful right; if we refuse to acknowledge the in-
terconnected and distributive qualities of property rights and property systems-
we will simply encourage false beliefs of entitlement, and mask the critical social
choices that property necessarily and inevitably involves.
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